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Gerard Noodt’s Standing in the Eighteenth-Century Dutch 
Debates on Religious Freedom 
Gerard Noodt’s address De religione ab imperio iure gentium libera was held in 
1706, when the conscience européenne, as Paul Hazard phrased it, was well into 
its crisis. Consequently it has been suggested that it might be worthwhile to 
determine whether the address, praised as ‘the first principled defence of toleration 
based on natural law’, marked a turning point in the Dutch toleration debates.1 The 
question, however, now seems unwarranted. It has become clear that if Noodt’s 
address can be qualified as principled and even as radical, it was hardly unique: it 
had been preceded by texts that were in many respects more extreme.2 This 
professorial oration by a noteworthy scholar of law – Gerard Noodt (1647-1725) 
was doubtless one of the outstanding students of Roman law in early-modern 
Europe – did not, then, represent a turning point. But it certainly can be seen as a 
hallmark in the history of ideas. 
Surprisingly, the influence of Noodt’s address in the eighteenth century has not 
been gauged. His contemporaries regarded Noodt’s performance in Leiden as a 
memorable event, and throughout the eighteenth century writers hailed it as one of 
the major contributions to the debate on religious freedom and toleration. In 1734, 
for example, in an attempt to make the Dutch text of the address available to a 
broad public, it was reissued in a cheap octavo edition together with, among 
others, Dutch translations of John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, a 
commentary on the church Fathers by the law scholar Jean Barbeyrac, and a 
sermon by the Anglican divine Benjamin Hoadly.3 The publisher was Isaac Tirion, 
an Amsterdam Mennonite, who wrote a short preface to the book. 
Noodt, says Tirion in his preface, was the first to broach the issue of religious 
freedom in an academy. In some countries it would not have been safe for a 
professor to criticize accepted customs. But, claims Tirion, in his address Noodt 
had not, in fact, criticized the High Authorities. He had simply defended their 
policies. He had merely demonstrated that the toleration they exercised was 
actually based on the law of nations, and he had emphasized that this practice was 
a prime duty of every civil, Christian government. Noodt had been permitted to 
speak freely about this, and the composure with which he made his point deserves 
much praise. 
Tirion was surely right in stating that Noodt evinced courage in bringing these 
matters to the fore in public, in the midst of the Leiden academy. His account, 
however, poses a problem. If Noodt had simply been giving the actual policies of 
the Dutch civil authorities a theoretical finish, why reissue his text? In the 
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following I shall attempt to outline, and account for, the nature of the reception of 
Noodt’s address on religious freedom in the eighteenth-century Netherlands.4 I 
shall generally argue that because Noodt failed to sufficiently clarify his own 
position and point out the implications of his argument, his text could be, and was, 
interpreted in very different ways. It could be seen to defend the status quo, but it 
could also be employed by subversive pamphleteers as an incisive critique of the 
Dutch ancien régime. First I shall briefly discuss the address itself, and then focus 
on one of Noodt’s most important disciples, Jean Barbeyrac. Subsequently I shall 
try to determine Noodt’s influence on four currents in Dutch intellectual life. 
These currents are respectively republican political thought, radical criticism, 
orthodox Calvinism, and the natural law school. 
The Address 
Gerard Noodt’s address De religione ab imperio iure gentium libera, ‘On religion 
as free from domination according to the law of nations’, may have been inspired 
in part by his sympathy towards the Remonstrants. Indeed, as late as 1786 an 
Italian critic believed him to have belonged to the factio Arminianorum; and his 
biographer Van den Bergh suggests that after 1706 orthodox Leiden ministers took 
measures against Noodt himself by excluding him from the church council.5 
Apparently the address was regarded as somewhat controversial; but it was not 
controversial enough to lead to serious repercussions. 
In the later debates on religious freedom, three of the points made by Noodt 
were to be of particular relevance.6 First, Noodt argues that individuals are wholly 
free to ascertain their own religious beliefs. Man has been created with the natural 
inclination to obtain what he deems good and to avoid what he deems bad, to 
search after truth by the light of reason, to distinguish between the true and 
permanent on one hand, and the false and ephemeral on the other. Man, therefore, 
is possessed of a natural freedom to compare and choose, even in matters 
concerning religion. 
Second, individuals possess freedom of association. Noodt elaborates on the 
freedom of the believer to join any church society and to leave it again if he wishes 
to do so. As long as he remains a member of such a society, a believer is not, of 
course, free to do as he likes; he must abide by the rules instituted by that society. 
But Noodt contends that a believer has no less the right to leave the persuasion of 
his choosing than he had the right to join it in the first place. 
Third, religion is free from the influence of the civil authorities. Since nobody 
in the state of nature has the freedom to pronounce judgements on God and His 
                                                     
4
 For a historiographical overview of recent Dutch scholarship on toleration, see my ‘The Eighteenth-
Century Dutch “Toleration” Debate. Some Considerations With Regard to Contemporary 
Approaches’, in: Dutch Crossing 1 (1998) (forthcoming). 
5
 G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, The Life and Work of Gerard Noodt (1647-1725). Dutch Legal Scholarship 
between Humanism and Enlightenment, Oxford, 1988, pp. 225, 229-234, 238. 
6
 I have used G. Noodt, Opera omnia, recognita, aucta, emendata, multis in locis, atque in duos 
tomos distributa. Accessit V.Cl. Joannis Barbeyracii historica vitae auctoris narratis, Leiden, Th. 
Haak, 1760, I, pp. 518-526 (‘De religione ab imperio jure gentium libera’). This is the text of the first 
edition, published in quarto: Gerardi Noodt, jurisconsulti, dissertatio de religione ab imperio jure 
gentium libera, habita in Academia Lugduno-Batava a.d. VI. Id. Febr. A. MDCCVI. cum abiret 
magnifici rectoris munere, Leiden, F. Haaring, MDCCVI. 
 3
worship, no prince can be accorded the right to judge in matters of religion. The 
awe inspired by civil power has not been created to prevent freedom, but to steer 
freedom so as to further the common good. The dominion of a prince should 
concern the welfare of the civil state only; all other matters, including religion, are 
beyond his jurisdiction. 
Using arguments derived from natural law, Noodt thus observed that religious 
freedom required the fulfillment of at least three conditions: (1) individuals must 
be free to choose their own persuasion; (2) they may voluntarily join or leave a 
church society; and (3) the civil authorities should not interfere in religious affairs. 
None of these conditions was particularly novel. They resemble, for one, those of 
the Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke’s famous essay, which was 
published anonymously in 1689. It is probably safe to assume that Noodt had read 
the essay. Locke too defined the church as a voluntary society and restricted the 
influence of the state. The difference, of course, was Noodt’s appeal to natural 
law. The contrast between Locke and Noodt is evident from the titles of their 
writings. Locke wrote a treatise on toleration; Noodt held an address on religious 
freedom. Locke was concerned with establishing an ordered Christian polity, the 
civil authorities of which were expected to interfere as little as possible in 
religious affairs. Noodt was concerned with providing arguments for individual 
religious freedom, and he looked upon this freedom, not as a matter of toleration, 
but as one of natural right. 
We can understand the impact which Noodt’s address must have had on the 
Leiden audience of 1706, and why he apparently was so nervous while delivering 
it that he inadvertently trespassed on the rules of elocution.7 In lively and concise 
Latin, which according to Jean Leclerc was reminiscent of both Seneca and 
Tacitus,8 Noodt argued that the authorities, in tolerating religions other than the 
official, Calvinist one, were not granting them a favour but giving them their 
rightful due. This was a firm statement, and over the years it would inspire many 
writers. 
Nevertheless, Noodt’s text raises more questions than it answers them. One of 
the most important questions concerns the precise nature of religious freedom, or, 
as Noodt puts it, of religion as free from domination. Is it the freedom to profess a 
particular form of worship with impunity? Does it include the freedom to associate 
in any form, at any time and on any condition? Can atheists, who have no use for 
religion, stake a claim to such freedom? If, however, all men and women are 
expected to make a positive religious choice, on what grounds are they supposed to 
do so? On the basis of a minimalist natural religion grounded in reason? Religious 
freedom should then be the property, not only of Jews and muslims, but also of 
deists. Or should we restrict such considerations to a Christian society? Does the 
Bible, then, contain the grounds for making a proper choice? If so, are Roman 
Catholics to be tolerated? The large majority of Protestants would have claimed 
that the authority of the Catholics was not the Bible but the Pope. It may well be 
that Noodt, in delivering his address, had been thinking first and foremost of the 
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Remonstrant minority in the Netherlands. But how far would he have been willing 
to go in conferring religious freedom on Socinians or anti-Trinitarians? 
Socinianism continued to be regarded as one of the principal threats to the 
Christian tradition until well into the eighteenth century. Had Noodt defended the 
freedom of Socinians to publicly vent their ideas, the repercussions following his 
address could have been a lot more serious than his mere exclusion from the 
Leiden church council. 
Noodt, in other words, failed to make explicit the implications of his argument 
from natural law for the practical exigencies of a Christian commonwealth. As an 
academic he was not, of course, wholly free to discuss these implications, but we 
may well ask whether he would have wanted to do so. A large portion of his 
address is concerned with refuting the idea that it is legitimate to use force on an 
individual conscience.9 This approach seems to reveal Noodt’s limited intentions. 
Perhaps we could draw a parallel with his other controversial address, on the rights 
of sovereign power and the lex regia, which he had held in 1699 and which 
according to Leclerc similarly pleaded a fundamental cause of humankind.10 In this 
earlier address Noodt, in opposing the absolutist tendencies of his age, had not 
been proposing radical reform, let alone revolution; he had (probably) been 
making a stand against the monarchical ambitions of the stadholder-king William 
III. During the last two or three decades of the seventeenth century there had been 
a rather severe clamp down on books and ideas in the Dutch Republic.11 
Conceivably, in 1706 Noodt may simply have wanted to influence views relating 
to freedom of religious expression within the political and religious establishment. 
However this may be, the ambiguities in his address on religious freedom would 
lead to very different interpretations of his text.12 
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Jean Barbeyrac 
Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744), professor of law at Groningen university since 1717, 
was one of the leading Huguenot intellectuals of his time. His main contribution 
was in the field of natural law, particularly through his translations of Grotius and 
Pufendorf. His footnotes to these editions were extremely popular during much of 
the eighteenth century; it is through these notes, for example, that he disseminated 
Locke’s ideas on the continent. A major writer on toleration, Barbeyrac had 
completed a French translation of Noodt’s address by the end of 1706, when he 
was still working at the Collège Français in Berlin.13 It was published the 
following year as a ‘Discours sur la liberté de conscience’.14 
The change of title is striking. At first glance it would seem that according to 
Barbeyrac, Noodt’s address had more to do with freedom of conscience than with 
the freedom of religion from political supremacy. To be sure, in his introduction 
Barbeyrac does observe that it is indisputable ‘que le Souverain, de quelque titre 
superbe qu’il soit revêtu, n’a pas plus de Pouvoir que n’en demande le Bien 
Public; & qu’il faut laisser à chacun une pleine liberté de suivre la Religion qui lui 
paroit la meilleure.’15 But the ‘pleine liberté’ intended appears to be liberty of 
conscience – to be defended, if need be, by violent resistence16 – rather than full 
and public freedom of worship. A similar emphasis on liberty of conscience is 
evident in the English and German translations of Noodt’s text, which were all to 
some extent based on Barbeyrac’s edition and comments. The first English 
translation, The Right of Liberty of Conscience (1708) by John Savage (1673-
1747), followed Barbeyrac’s French version.17 The second, Liberty of Conscience  
by Aulay Macaulay (1758-1819), appeared much later in 1781, and was translated 
from the Latin, but included Barbeyrac’s notes.18 In 1724 a German translation was 
published, Rede von der Freyheit des Gewissens, for which both the Latin as well 
                                                     
13
 Cf. Ph. Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) et les débuts de l’enseignement du droit dans 
l’ancienne Académie de Lausanne. Contribution à l’histoire du droit naturel, Lausanne, 1937, pp. 
61-62. 
14
 I have consulted the first and second editions, as well as the 1731 edition mentioned in the 
following note. The first edition is De pouvoir des souverains; et de la liberté de conscience. En deux 
discours, traduits du Latin de Mr. Noodt, professeur en droit dans l’université de Leide: par Jean 
Barbeyrac, Amsterdam, Thomas Lombrail, MDCCVII. The second, revised and enlarged edition has the 
same title (Amsterdam, P. Humbert, MDCCXIV: ‘Seconde edition, revuë, & augmentée de plusieurs 
notes’). The motto on the title page is taken from Tacitus’ Historiae, L. I, C. I: ‘Rarâ temporum 
felicitate, ubi sentire quæ velis, & quæ sentias dicere licet’. Both the second and the 1731 editions 
include the same ‘Préface du traducteur’ (pp. I-XX), signed Barbeyrac, Berlin, 20-12-1706. The 
French title of the address is ‘Discours sur la liberté de conscience: Où l’on fait voir, que par le Droit 
de la Nature & des Gens, la RELIGION n’est point soûmise à l’Autorité Humaine’. The 1731 edition 
(vol. I) is enlarged with notes by Barbeyrac; there are also some slight changes in the translation. 
15
 ‘Preface du traducteur sur les deux discours de Mr. Noodt. Telle qu’elle étoit dans la prémière 
edition, de MDCCVII’, in: J. Barbeyrac, Receuil de discours sur diverses matieres importantes, 2 
vols., Amsterdam, P. Humbert, MDCCXXXI, I, p. 4. 
16
 See espec. T.J. Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of Conscience: Natural Law Theory, Obligation, and 
Resistance in the Huguenot Diaspora’, in: J.C. Laursen ed., New Essays on the Political Thought of 
the Huguenots of the Réfuge, Leiden etc., 1995, pp. 15-51. 
17
 The Power of the Sovereign, and the Right of Liberty of Conscience in Two Discourses, London, 
Andrew Bell, 1708; Ahsmann-Feenstra, Bibliografie, nrs. 442. 
18
 Two discourses; on Sovereign Power, and Liberty of Conscience, London, C. Dilly, 1781. See 
Ahsmann-Feenstra, Bibliografie, nrs. 443. 
 6
as Barbeyrac’s French version were used.19 This in turn appears to have been used 
in 1728 by a radical pietist, Johann Chistian Seitz (no dates known), who 
published Noodt’s address in a collection of tracts resembling the Tirion edition, 
and which also included a translation of Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, as 
well as writings by Seitz himself and the pietist leader Ph.J. Spener (1635-1705).20 
In terms of the Dutch context, the change of title possibly reflects the limited 
concern evinced by Dutch authors for in-depth analyses of the human conscience 
and its relations to religious liberty.21 The Dutch may have had little interest in the 
topic because Article XIII of the Union of Utrecht (1579), which more or less 
functioned as the constitution of the Republic, seemed to them to adequately 
vouchsafe liberty of conscience. Indeed, in the Netherlands neither the most 
rigorous Calvinist divine nor the most authoritarian regent would not have found it 
wise to deny that a man was free to maintain whatever opinions his conscience 
enjoined him to uphold. Barbeyrac, then, could seem to be disputing above all the 
use of dragonnades by Louis XIV to suppress French Protestantism. In this 
interpretation, and with the new title, the general purport of Noodt’s address would 
have appeared harmless enough to Dutch readers. 
But perhaps we should not set too much store by a change of title. Barbeyrac, in 
any event, had a second and less obvious intention. In view of the fact that his 
scholarly life in Berlin had recently been made very uncomfortable by orthodox 
leaders of the French Reformed church,22 it seems that we should also interpret his 
translation of Noodt’s address as a contribution to the defence of freedom of 
public expression. We may surmise that Barbeyrac made use of Noodt’s address, 
not only to combat religious intolerance in France, but also to dispute the influence 
exercised on the civil authorities by both the Prussian and the Dutch clergy, in 
particular regarding the religious views of those pursuing a public career. This 
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latter purpose is reflected in a long, anti-clerical footnote added by Barbeyrac23 – 
who himself was, of course, hardly a paragon of Calvinist orthodoxy, as is 
evidenced by his general opposition to the Swiss Formula Consensus of 1675 and 
the obligation to subscribe to it. 
Barbeyrac’s twofold agenda – freedom of conscience and freedom from clerical 
influence – is reflected in the way he annotated Noodt’s address. He added 77 
footnotes to three of the five short ones provided by Noodt himself,24 in 
consequence of which the French version of the address grew to more than a 
hundred pages in octavo.25 The footnotes provide a wealth of references, which 
can be classified into three groups. There are references to classical sources, 
notably the Stoics Cicero and Seneca, and the Church Father Lactantius (who was 
known as the ‘Christian Cicero’).26 The second group of references consists of 
sources probably used by Noodt, among others Hugo Grotius.27 The third and most 
interesting group pertain to references to parallel arguments in contemporary 
writings. This group includes both Noodt28 and Barbeyrac29 themselves, as well as 
Gilbert Burnet,30 Jean Leclerc31 and Samuel Pufendorf.32 There are references to 
the Conversations sur diverses matieres de religion (1687), a tract written by the 
French Socinian Charles le Cène (1647-1703), to which was appended a treatise on 
toleration by another Socinian, Johan Crellius (1590-1633).33 The Remonstrant 
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Adriaan van Paets (1631-1686) is also referred to,34 as well as Matthew Tindal 
(1653-1733).35 The most interesting references, however, are to Pierre Bayle’s 
Commentaire Philosophique and John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. 
Bayle’s Commentaire is mentioned eleven times, including the famous chapters in 
which he argues that an erring conscience has precisely the same rights as an 
unerring one.36 The eight references to Locke mainly concern the need for a strict 
separation between church and state.37 
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Timothée de S. Amour, MDCLXXXVII. The treatise on toleration, on pp. 220-287, is ‘De la tolerance 
dans la religion, ou de la liberté de conscience. Au Roi de France & à son Conseil’, by J. Crellius. 
The references to these writings in Barbeyrac’s Receuil de discours are on pp. 186 (Conversations, 
pp. 74-77: on the ‘opiniâtreté’ of heretics), 201 (Conversations, pp. 252-259: Crellius on heresy as 
supposedly the cause of civil disorder), 219 (Conversations, pp. 89-92 and 264-270, on the 
applicability of Old Testament law). 
34
 A. van Paets, Epistola de nuperis Angliae motibus, in qua de diversum a publica religione circa 
divina sentientium disseritur tolerantia (a letter to Bayle, written in 1685 and printed by Bayle the 
following year); on Van Paets, see A. Rotondò, ‘Europe et Pays-Bas (...). Dimensions et articulations 
d’un projet de recherches’, in: Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, pp. 15-16 and 28. The 
reference to Van Paets in Barbeyrac’s Receuil de discours is on pp. 186-187, and concerns 
‘opiniâtreté’. 
35
 Receuil de discours, note on pp. 153-154, which refers to a discussion of Tindal’s The Rights of the 
Christian Church Asserted Against the Romish and All Other Priests, Who Claim an Independent 
Power Over It. With a Preface Concerning the Government of the Church of England, as by Law 
Established, Part I, London, MDCCVI, in Leclerc’s Bibliotheque Choisie, pour servir de suite a la 
Bibliotheque Universelle, Tome X, Amsterdam, Freres Wetstein, MDCCXX, Article VII, pp. 305-363. 
Barbeyrac refers to Leclerc’s summary, where Tindal discusses the power that should be given to the 
‘Magistrat, en matieres de Religion’ (p. 321). 
36
 Receuil de discours, notes on pp. 120-121 (Commentaire, Préface, p. 363: on a passage in Dio 
Cassius, where Emperor Augustus is advised not to tolerate religious innovations), 148 
(Commentaire, I, ii, pp. 371-372: constraint cannot induce religious faith), 153 (Commentaire, I, vi, 
pp. 384-385: the civil authorites may not enforce laws in matters concerning religion), 180 
(Commentaire, I, v, p. 377 and II, v, p. 414: people change their religious views if they believe this to 
be necessary), 182 (Commentaire, II, x, pp. 436-440 and the Suplement, xiii, pp. 523-525: error is the 
result of human weakness), 182-183 (Commentaire, III, art. iii, iv, viii, xxx, pp. 448-464: comments 
on statements by Augustine), 186 (Commentaire, I, i, pp. 393-397: on the misuse of violence as a 
means to confront people with the truth), 198 (Commentaire, II, v, p. 412 and II, ix, pp. 431-432 and 
the Suplement, xxxi, pp. 559-560: the magistrate may implement laws against sects who pose a threat 
to the public order), 201 (Commentaire, Préface, p. 364 and II, vi, p. 416: innovations in religion do 
not necessarily pose a threat to the public order), 214 (Commentaire, II, viii-ix, pp. 422-433: an 
erring conscience has the same rights as an unerring one), 219 (Commentaire, II, iv, pp. 409-410: on 
the differences between Old Testament law and the Gospel). Barbeyrac refers to both the first (1686-
1687) and the Rotterdam, 1713 edition of the Commentaire; I have consulted the Commentaire 
philosophique sur ces paroles de Jesus-Christ, contrain-les d’entrer; où l’on prouve, par plusieurs 
raisons demonstratives, qu’il n’y a rien de plus abominables que de faire des conversions par la 
contrainte: et où l’on réfute tous les sophismes des conversiteurs à contrainte, & l’Apologie que St. 
Augustin a faite des persécutions. Traduit de l’Anglois du Sieur Jean Fox de Bruggs par M.J.F, in: 
Oeuvres diverses, ed. E. Labrousse, Hildesheim, 1965 (facs. ed. of the Oeuvres diverses, La Haye, P. 
Husson et al, MDCCXXVII) II, pp. 355-560. 
37
 The following references are to Receuil de discours and Locke’s Epistola de tolerantia. A Letter on 
Toleration, R. Klibansky and J.W. Gough eds., Oxford, 1968. Receuil, pp. 146-147 (Epistola, p. 72, 
l. 12-26: on the right of every society to fix its own laws), 152-153 (Epistola, p. 66, l. 19-23; p. 90, l. 
5-10; p. 121, l. 10-23: salvation is not a concern of the civil authorities), 170 (Epistola, p. 94, l. 2-21: 
the civil authorities cannot procure salvation for us), 171 (Epistola, p. 94, l. 22-28: the magistrate 
sometimes grants religious authority to the church), 175 (Epistola, p. 98-99, l. 21-30 and l. 1-11: a 
man will not be saved if he does not sincerely believe what he professes to believe), 198 (Epistola, p. 
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How influential was Barbeyrac’s edition of Noodt’s address? It would seem 
that the former’s annotations enjoyed greater popularity abroad38 than in the 
Netherlands. In this respect the choice of Barbeyrac’s annotations for the Tirion 
edition of 1734 is revealing. Most of the references discussed above are dispensed 
with, including those regarding Bayle. Those concerning Locke are the main 
exception, probably because the Letter Concerning Toleration itself was included 
in the Tirion edition, so that the reader could read the full text at his or her 
discretion.39 Of greater interest are the changes made to the few remaining notes 
taken from Barbeyrac’s edition, since they clearly show the anti-clerical 
sentiments of the person who revised the translation. I have good reason to believe 
that this person was the Remonstrant minister Johannes Drieberge (1686-1746), 
after 1737 a colleague of Jean Leclerc at the Remonstrant seminary in Amster-
dam.40 I shall return to him below. The anticlerical tenor in the Tirion edition is 
evident from the use, in the selection of Barbeyrac’s annotations, of phrases like 
‘the bloodthirsty morals’ of ecclesiastics, and from arguments pointing towards the 
moderate administration of the Romans as opposed to that of Christian rulers.41 
One of the notes added by the reviser himself is a firm rejection of the clergy’s 
attempt to suppress dissent by invoking secular power – a clear allusion to the 
policies of the Calvinist church vis-à-vis the Remonstrants.42 
What do these changes to Noodt’s text in the Tirion edition mean? They seem 
to imply that neither Noodt’s address nor Barbeyrac’s annotations were deemed 
unambiguous enough. The latter’s claims with regard to the freedom of the 
religious conscience were all but accepted as a matter of course; what the Dutch 
‘dissenters’ apparently needed now was a more comprehensive, more concerted or 
                                                                                                                                      
142, l. 16-18: force may be used against those who commit unlawful activities under the guise of 
religion), and 204 and 215. Barbeyrac refers to both the Latin text and the French translation. The 
latter appeared as Lettre sur la tolérance in the Oeuvres diverses de Monsieur Jean Locke, Rotterdam, 
1710; reprint Amsterdam, 1732. There are also references to An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding Essay; cf. the note on p. 133, which refers to Essay, I , iii, § 6 (on the different 
notions concerning God). 
38
 The German and English translations make use of Barbeyrac’s annotations. I have not been able to 
verify the extent to which they do so, since none of these translations are extant in the Netherlands. 
39
 See De godsdienst vry van heerschappye, naar het regt der volkeren, in: Verzameling van eenige 
verhandelingen (Tirion edition, 1734, pp. 1-60; the pagination in this collection is not continuous; 
Noodt’s treatise is the second one, following on Locke), pp. 18, 30, 33, 44, 47, 52. Thus 6 out of 8 
references to Locke in Barbeyrac’s edition have been retained. The total number of notes in the Tirion 
edition of Noodt’s address is 23, including three of Noodt’s own footnotes and two added by the 
reviser himself. 
40
 For evidence regarding Drieberge’s probable authorship, see my Mutua Christianorum Tolerantia. 
Irenicism and Toleration in the Netherlands: The Stinstra Affair 1740-1745 (Studi e testi per la 
storia della tolleranza in Europa nei secoli XVI-XVIII 2), Firenze, 1998, pp. 55-64. Additional 
evidence is provided by several changes in the footnotes. For example, Noodt had mentioned 
Anacharsis and Socrates in his text, and Barbeyrac had at this point referred the reader to Dion 
Cassius; in the Tirion edition, however, the reader is referred to H. Prideaux, The Old and New 
Testament connected (1716-1718), a book translated by Drieberge into Dutch in 1723. 
41
 Tirion edition, p. 13 (Barbeyrac’s Receuil de discours, pp. 136-137: on the tolerant attitude of 
Gothic kings), p. 44 (Receuil de discours, pp. 198-199: on the policies of Tiberius). Barbeyrac’s own 
anticlerical footnote (see above) is also retained. 
42
 Tirion edition, pp. 47-48. Another note added by the reviser concerns the Roman Catholic 
(‘Papism’ was invariably an oblique reference to Calvinist divines) treatment of heretics as less than 
human; see pp. 20-21. 
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more open defence of the freedom of public expression. The reviser of Barbeyrac’s 
footnotes extended their limited anti-clerical tenor in order to directly undermine 
the moral legitimacy of the dominant position held by the Calvinist clergy. This 
attack on the public church as an established institution that safeguarded the 
continuation of government policy vis-à-vis the religious dissenters implied a 
demand for complete freedom of religious inquiry, expression and worship. Not 
surprisingly, when the Tirion edition was reissued in 1774, as an offshoot of the 
so-called ‘Socratic War’ which was waged in the years around 1770,43 the editor, 
the Remonstrant Abraham Arent van der Meersch (1720-1792), not only added 73 
of Barbeyrac’s original notes, but also retained all of the anti-clerical emendations 
in the 1734 edition.44 
Thus the revisers of the first and second Tirion editions directly addressed the 
implications of religious freedom for the Christian commonwealth, an issue neither 
Noodt not Barbeyrac – who as university professors were not expected to 
undermine the established order – had broached as explicitly as their subsequent 
readers would have wished.45 Barbeyrac’s own discussion of toleration in his 
famous Traité de la morale des Pères des Église is similarly ambivalent.46 In spite 
                                                     
43
 The Socratic War was occasioned by J.F. Marmontel’s Bélisaire; cf. E.G.E. van der Wall, ‘De 
vaderlandse kerk en het vaderlandse verleden. De socratische oorlog over voorrechten en 
verdraagzaamheid’, in: P.H.A.M. Abels et al, De kerk in de kop. Bouwstenen tot de kerkgeschiedenis 
van Noord-West Overijssel, Delft, 1995, pp. 11-32. 
44
 [A.A. van der Meersch], De vryheid van godsdienst in de burgerlyke maatschappy betoogd en 
verdeedigd, uit het regt der nature en der volken, en uit de nature van den Kristelyken godsdienst, 
door de zeer vermaarde mannen Locke, Noodt, Barbeyrac, Hoadly en Drieberge (...), Amsterdam, J. 
Dóll, 1774. All of Barbeyrac’s references discussed above were included in this edition. Additions by 
Van der Meersch include references to the Dutch translation of Arthur Ashley Sykes, The Innocency 
of Error, Asserted, and Vindicated (1715) (pp. 265 and 266); Van der Meersch’s own Dutch 
translation of William Warburton’s The Divine Legation of Moses (De goddelijke zending van Mozes, 
5 vols., 1761-1771) (p. 279); and the refutation of Justus Lipsius’ De una religione by Dirk Volckertz 
Coornhert (p. 274). 
45
 This is not to say, of course, that the intentions of Noodt and Barbeyrac were not more or less 
radical. The point is that as members of the establishment they had to operate carefully. Barbeyrac’s 
use of Bayle perhaps exemplifies this. Rather than draw out the full implications of the Commentaire 
philosophique in his work, he incorporates Bayle’s arguments into discourses in which atheists and 
Roman Catholics are excluded from toleration, and a publicly established church is accepted as 
necessary. The need to avoid suspicions of anti-clericalism and subversion in public statements, as 
well as the second-generation Huguenots’ recognition of the political realites of their host countries, 
probably account largely for the ‘truncation’ of Bayle’s arguments in the eighteenth century, and for 
the rejection of Bayle’s scepticism. Contrast C. Berkvens-Stevelinck, ‘La tolérance et l’héritage de P. 
Bayle en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle’, in: Lias 5 (1978), pp. 257-272 with J.C. 
Laursen, ‘The Politics of a Publishing Event: the Marchand Milieu and The Life and Spirit of Spinoza 
of 1719’, in: S. Berti, F. Charles-Daubert and R.H. Popkin eds., Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and Free 
Thought in Early-Eighteenth-Century Europe. Studies on the Traité des Trois Imposteurs’, Dordrecht 
etc., 1996, pp. 273-296. 
46
 Traité de la morale des Peres de l’Eglise: Où en défendant un Article de la Preface sur 
PUFFENDORF, contre l'APOLOGIE DE LA MORALE DES PERES du P. CEILLIER, Religieux Bénédictin de la 
Congregation de St. Vanne & de St. Hydulphe, on fait diverses reflexions sur plusieurs matieres 
importantes. Par Jean Barbeyrac, professeur en droit à Groningue, & membre de la Societé Roiale 
des Sciences à Berlin, Amsterdam, Pierre de Coup, MDCCXXVIII. Incidentally, in the Traité Noodt’s 
address as such is not referred to. Barbeyrac refers several times, not to Noodt’s address as such, but 
to his own annotations; see pp. 172-173 (§ XI), 192-193 (§ LI), 202 (§ LXIII). All these notes concern 
Barbeyrac’s references to parallel arguments in Bayle, Le Cène, etc. 
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of, or rather as a result of this ambivalence (since like Noodt’s address the Traité 
could be quoted with impunity), the Traité, in particular the twelfth chapter, was 
well-known among all parties in the Dutch toleration debates. In fact, the 
unintended effect of Barbeyrac’s work on toleration was to definitively relegate his 
teacher Gerard Noodt to the reverential status of a godfather. Barbeyrac himself 
came to be seen as the chief interpreter of the argument from natural law originally 
put forward by Noodt.47 In consequence, most writers would henceforth come to 
Noodt via Barbeyrac.48 
The Republicans 
One group of writers who valued Gerard Noodt included those who elaborated on 
republican political theory, and sometimes discussed religious freedom in passing. 
One characteristic author in this tradition was Lieven de Beaufort (1675-1730), a 
leading magistrate from Zeeland, whose Verhandeling van de vryheit in den 
burgerstaet (Treatise on Freedom in the Civil State) was published posthumously 
in 1737. Like Noodt, De Beaufort criticized the princely absolutism of his age and 
defended republican theory with an appeal to the history of ancient Rome. 
Rejecting the powerful position traditionally occupied by the princes of Orange as 
stadholders over the various Dutch provinces, he vindicated his views on classical 
republicanism and discussed the threats to freedom posed by, among others, luxury 
and ambition.49 Unfortunately, De Beaufort provides no references to other 
writings. 
De Beaufort firmly believed that the Calvinist church was part and parcel of the 
Dutch constitution, and that greater freedom for the religious minorities was quite 
unnecessary. However, this is not to say that he, as a typical exponent of the regent 
aristocracy, would not have cared to appeal to Noodt’s address on religious 
freedom. If he believed that the status quo had to be maintained, he was also an 
advocate of mild and moderate government. He would probably not have approved 
of high-handed clericalism and ostentatious ecclesiastical supremacy. Tirion had in 
mind this policy of moderation when he observed in 1734 that Gerard Noodt 
merely lent theoretical support to common government procedure. This was also 
the claim of the anonymous translator of the Dutch edition of Noodt’s address on 
religious freedom, in an introduction prefixed to the Dutch octavo editions of 
                                                     
47
 For an example of Barbeyrac’s indebtedness to Noodt, see S. Zurbuchen, Naturrecht und 
natürliche Religion. Zur Geschichte des Toleranzproblems von Samuel Pufendorf bis Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Würzburg, 1991, pp. 141-142. In his address Noodt limited the sovereign’s exercise of 
power to matters of social well-being and argued that public morality could not be enforced; 
Barbeyrac used this distinction between law and morality to criticize and develop Pufendorf’s natural 
law theory (note that other authors attribute Barbeyrac’s use of this distinction to Christian 
Thomasius). 
48
 Noodt hardly figures in encyclopedic dictionaries published between 1730 and 1750; see H. Bots 
and R. van der Schoor, ‘La tolérance à travers les dictionnaires dans les décennies autour de 1700’, 
in: Emergence of Tolerance, pp. 141-153, espec. 148. Unfortunately the authors do not make clear 
what Barbeyrac’s status was. 
49
 For a discussion, see W.R.E. Velema, ‘God, de deugd en de oude constitutie. Politieke talen in de 
eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw’, in: Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden 102 (1987), pp. 476-497, espec. 478-485; and I.J.H. Worst, ‘Staat, constitutie en 
politieke wil’, in: idem, pp. 498-515, espec. 501-506 
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1706, 1707, 1716 and 1719 (and possibly 1732).50 ‘Worthy countrymen’, this 
translator remarks, ‘You actually possess the Religious freedom which our 
praiseworthy Author has irrefutably shown to be the right of all Peoples,’ and 
which is maintained by those who now govern the Fatherland.51 Such statements 
were often obliquely anti-clerical,52 and this could be the reason why the translator 
did not divulge his name. On the other hand, it is telling that Noodt’s address was 
no longer published independently after about 1730. More radical texts were now 
of greater pertinence to the Dutch toleration debates. 
Classical republicanism surfaced again in the so-called ‘Patriottentijd’ between 
1780 and 1787, an eventful period in Dutch history. The democratic political ideas 
and activities of these years to some extent prefigured the French Revolution, and 
it seems only logical that Noodt’s address on the lex regia was translated into 
Dutch in 1784.53 It was not, however, translated primarily for its contents. Since 
several leading academic jurists – probably scholars like A. Kluit (1735-1807), and 
perhaps also F.W. Pestel (1724-1805) – had recently been propounding 
conservative views, the Patriot writers needed a Dutch legal scholar who 
effectively demonstrated that the people’s sovereignty was an indefeasible natural 
right, and who could be quoted in support of radical democratic authors like 
Richard Price and Joseph Priestley. Who could fulfill this vacancy better than ‘the 
very famous Professor NOODT’?54 
                                                     
50
 De godsdienst vry van heerschappye naer het recht der Volkeren: beweert in een redenvoeringe 
van den zeer beroemden en hooggeleerden Heer, Gerard Noodt, rechtsgeleerde in de Academie te 
Leiden op den achtsten dagh van February 1706. Wanneer hy de waerdigheit van Rector Magnificus 
neder leide. Uit het Latyn in ’t Nederduitsch gebragt door E.B.D.V. Den derden druk op nieuws 
overzien, Amsterdam, Jacob ter Beek, 1719. This is a reissue of the third edition; earlier editions have 
exactly the same title (execpt that ‘Latyn’ is spelt as ‘Latijn’), with the additional comment that the 
translation in the second edition was reviewed by the writer himself. Cf. second edition: Leiden, F. 
Haaring, Amsterdam, A. van Damme, 1707; and third edition: Amsterdam, A. van Damme, 1716. See 
Ahsmann-Feenstra, Bibliografie, nrs. 453-456. The identity of ‘E.B.D.V.’ (= ‘Een Behoeder 
[Begunstiger, Beschermer] Der Vrijheid [Verdraagzaamheid]’? = ‘A Defender of Freedom 
[Toleration]’?) is unknown. Tirion mentions a fourth edition, apparently dating from about 1732; see 
his preface in the Verzameling van eenige verhandelingen, p. *3v. His edition of Noodt’s address 
mentions it as being the fifth edition. I have not been able to trace this edition, which is not mention 
in Ahsmann-Feenstra, Bibliografie. 
51
 Ibidem (ed. 1719), p. +2r: ‘De vryheit in ’t stuk van Godsdienst, waer toe onze roemwaerdigen 
Auteur zoo onwedersprekelijk aentoont alle Volken gerechtigt te wezen, bezit gy daedelijk. (...) Eert 
de tegenwoordige Regeerders van het Vaderlant, die U in het bezit daer van noch dagelijks met zoo 
veel yver hanthaven: (...).’ 
52
 For an example of a later republican regent who defended both authoritarian control of the church 
by the state and toleration for the dissenters, see [D. van Alphen], Het recht der overheden omtrent 
kerkelyke bedieningen, Leiden, Pieter van der Eyk, MDCCLVI. In vehemently anticlerical terms, Van 
Alphen puts forward a fully Erastian argument in favour of a public church, making allowances for 
freedom of conscience; for a defence of the latter he refers the reader to the ‘unsurpassed and 
immortally praiseworthy writings of the once so famous GERARD NOODT on the freedom of Worship 
from Domination’. 
53
 See for the seventtenth-century context of this address F. Lomonaco, Lex regia. Diritto, filologia e 
fides historica nella cultura politico-filosofia dell’Ollanda di fine seicento, Napoli, Guida, 1990. 
54
 Redevoering over het regt der opperste magt, door Gerard Noodt, in leeven, hoogleeraar in de 
regten, aan ’s lands universiteit te Leiden. Naar het Latyn en Fransch gevolgd, Amsterdam, Joh. 
Weppelmann, MDCCLXXXIV. In his preface the translator notes that he used the Latin text as well as 
the ‘excellent’ French translation of Barbeyrac. The translator partly retained Barbeyrac’s annotations 
and added some of his own (some of which refer to Barbeyrac’s edition of Pufendorf). The address on 
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The Dutch republican tradition of tolerationist thought had been inaugurated by 
Hugo Grotius and was later sustained by Pieter de la Court, Baruch Spinoza and 
Gerard Noodt himself.55 Yet eighteenth-century writers within this republican 
tradition evinced surprisingly little interest in Noodt’s address on religious 
freedom.56 This may be due to the fact that their interest tended to be a strictly 
political one; but it also illustrates Noodt’s chiefly symbolic function in the 
eighteenth century. Above all, his text was simply inadequate because it failed to 
spell out the precise implications of the claim to religious freedom, and, more 
importantly, to combine it with a comprehensive and realistic defence of 
intellectual liberty. Not Noodt (or Barbeyrac), but the radicals who will be 
discussed in the next section were the ones to first accomplish this transition from 
toleration to free thought.57 Noodt’s distinguished name was used to evoke a sense 
of scholarly authority, or the impression of intellectual continuity, but little use 
seems to have been made of the actual contents of his addresses. 
The classical political tradition was, of course, only one of various kinds of 
republicanism in the Netherlands. Writers who defended the central position of the 
stadholderate also adduced republican arguments, and they, too, made use of 
Gerard Noodt. But again, the writers belonging to this Orangist tradition made use 
of Noodt’s address on sovereignty and not his oration on religious freedom, and 
they referred to the former primarily in order to dispute the clearly so erroneous 
interpretations of new-fangled democrats. Moreover, Noodt was only cited as one 
authority among many. In 1757 Elie Luzac (1721-1796), for example, an Orangist 
writer and publisher well-versed in natural law,58 was ridiculed in a poem by the 
Staatsgezinde historian Jan Wagenaar for the pretentious display of his knowledge 
of legal scholars, including Grotius, Pufendorf, Heineccius, Noodt, Coccejus and 
Barbeyrac.59 Kluit, another well-known Orangist of the time, refuted the preface to 
the 1784 translation of the address on the lex regia by arguing that the views 
                                                                                                                                      
political power was also reissued in Les droits de Dieu, de la nature et des gens, tirés d’un livre de M. 
Abbadie intitulé Défense de la nation Britannique ou réponse à l’avis aux réfugiés. On y a ajouté un 
discours de M. Noodt sur les droits des souverains, Amsterdam, MDCCLXXV. In the ‘Avertissement de 
l’editeur’ Noodt is mentioned as a ‘célebre jurisconsulte’ who need not be introduced (p. *4v); pp. 
171-276 contains Barbeyrac’s French translation of the address. See Ahsmann-Feenstra, Bibliografie, 
nr. 441. On Priestley in the Netherlands, see P. van Gestel, ‘“De Verbasteringen van het 
Christendom”. Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) en de Nederlandse Verlichting’, in: De Achttiende 
Eeuw, 30 (1998), pp. 3-30. 
55
 See J.I. Israel, ‘Toleration in Seventeenth-Century Dutch and English Thought’, in: S. Groenveld 
and M. Wintle eds., The Exchange of Ideas. Religion, Scholarship and Art in Anglo-Dutch Relations 
in the Seventeenth Century, Zutphen, 1994, pp. 13-30. 
56
 Thus Noodt does not figure in the index of a recent monograph on late eighteenth-century classical 
republicanism in the Netherlands. See S.R.E. Klein, Patriots Republikanisme. Politieke cultuur in 
Nederland (1766-1787), Amsterdam, 1995. 
57
 Cf. the similar development from Barbeyrac to Richard Price outlined in P. Miller, Defining the 
Common Good. Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Cambridge, 1994, 
pp. 266-348; also J. Gascoigne, ‘Anglican Latitudinarianism, Rational Dissent and Political 
Radicalism in the Late Eighteenth Century’, in: K. Haakonssen ed., Enlightenment and Religion. 
Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 219-240. 
58
 W.R.E. Velema, Enlightenment and Conservatism in the Dutch Republic. The Political Thought of 
Elie Luzac (1721-1796), Assen, Maastricht, 1993. 
59
 See P. Geyl, ‘De Witten-oorlog, een pennestrijd in 1757’, in: idem, Pennestrijd over staat en 
historie, Groningen, 1971, p. 227. 
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expressed by Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, H. and S. Coccejus, Noodt and Huber 
differed from those put forward by Locke, Hutcheson, Price, Priestley, 
Montesquieu, Rousseau and Raynal. Noodt (argued Kluit), in spite of the 
rhetorical flourishes to which he was prone and which easily gave rise to 
misunderstandings, had not believed that popular sovereignty superceded the 
established constitution, except under very exceptional circumstances; and he had 
also believed popular sovereignty to have been conferred on the prince by means 
of a contract. Kluit accused the translator of Noodt’s address of a most biased 
interpretation.60 
Radical Dissent 
In 1740 Johannes Stinstra, a Dutch Mennonite from a small Frisian town called 
Harlingen, contributed substantially to a so-called Deductie, an extended 
argumentation in favour of religious freedom which was appended to a request 
submitted to the Frisian States. The request was a plea for exemption from 
subscription to a number of Trinitarian articles. Although the Deductie was 
immediately attacked by orthodox Calvinists and Mennonites, the controversy was 
soon eclipsed by another. Stinstra himself became a Socinian suspect. In a number 
of sermons, published in 1741, in which he again made a stand for religious 
freedom, he seemed to his clerical opponents to have denied the Trinity. Stinstra 
was duly indicted by the Calvinist clergy and after a vehement debate the States of 
Friesland suspended him in his capacity of Mennonite minister until he had 
exonerated himself from all accusations. Stinstra, however, continued to refuse to 
subscribe to any article of faith. 
The so-called ‘Stinstra affair’61 is interesting, not only because it demonstrates 
Gerard Noodt’s status as the godfather of the Dutch toleration debate, but also 
because it illustrates the inadequacy of the natural law argument without a 
concomitant discussion of its practical implications for an existing Christian 
commonwealth. As I observed above, Noodt’s address could easily be interpreted 
as merely a defence of freedom of conscience, and this, in fact, seems to have been 
the more common reading of the text.62 The Deductie of 1740 opens with the 
natural law argument. Every person, it is claimed, has the duty and the right to 
inquire into the will of God according to his own reasonable understanding and 
judgement, and to make his own choices. Consequently, nobody should be subject 
to the directions of others or forced to undergo examination; the use of constraint 
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 See also A. Kluit, De souvereiniteit der Staten van Holland verdedigd tegen de hedendaagsche leer 
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 E.g. a mid-century spectator, De Nederlandsche Spectator, Leiden, Pieter van der Eyk, 1749, I, nr. 
17, p. 129, on the need to tolerate Jews on the basis of the ‘natural freedom of conscience’ defended 
by Locke, Barbeyrac and Noodt (in that order). 
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is unreasonable and contrary to the law of nature. All this, observes the writer of 
the Deductie, has been argued at length by scholars of fame, especially by Gerard 
Noodt and Jean Barbeyrac. 
If we look at the Deductie as a whole, however, it becomes clear that the 
argument from natural law is only one among several, and that it is not the most 
important one. The Deductie discusses arguments in favour of religious freedom 
derived from, among others, divine revelation, the Union of Utrecht, the 
Reformation, the laws and edicts of the Republic as well as the Province of 
Friesland, and even economic theory. The most important contention in the 
Deductie is not that human beings have the natural right to make their own 
choices, but that Christians are free to inquire into the character of the doctrines 
and morals of the New Testament. 
Unlike the natural law argument, this plea for freedom of biblical inquiry 
directly took issue with the problem of the Christian commonwealth and its limits. 
The Christian commonwealth, states the Deductie, is a Protestant commonwealth, 
and to be Protestant means to accept the Scriptures as the only rule of faith and 
doctrine, and reject all subscription to the rules or sentiments of fallible people. 
Moreover, the Deductie claims that religious freedom is the liberty to express any 
belief whatsoever, as long as it is phrased in biblical language. This argument for 
freedom of inquiry was far more radical than Noodt’s defence of religious freedom 
in terms of natural law. The Deductie not only implied that the orthodox Calvinist 
establishment blatantly trespassed on the right to free inquiry, but it also made 
clear that Socinians and anti-Trinitarians too possessed this right. The Deductie 
was, consequently, a very radical text. 
It is revealing that it was this Protestant right to freedom of inquiry, and not the 
natural right to decide freely on religious truth, that was immediately pounced 
upon by the Calvinist clergy. And it is telling that Stinstra himself, in the sermons 
on religious freedom for which he was prosecuted, made no use at all of Noodt’s 
address. Stinstra was representative of a radical group of Dutch dissenters who 
were strongly influenced by English anti-Trinitarians, and who disputed both the 
Christian orthodoxy of, and Calvinist domination within, the Dutch Republic.63 
This group, who included Johannes Drieberge, revered Gerard Noodt, and they 
found it helpful to use his name in order to legitimize their critique and disguise 
their radicalism;64 but in the final analysis they could not put his argument from 
natural law to good use, simply because it generalized too much. 
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 This group differs from the one discussed in M.C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment. Pantheists, 
Freemasons and Republicans, London etc., 1981; Jacob’s radical Enlightenment was negligible in 
terms of Dutch eighteenth-century history. 
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 Cf. Drieberge, Vervolg van aenmerkingen, waer in het antwoord des heren Joan vanden Honert 
T.H. zoon, bedienaer des H. Evangeliums te Haerlem, op de voorgaende aenmerkingen word 
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uytgesproken, in het replicq door den heer advocaat Hermanus Noordkerk (…) op Dingsdag 14 Mey 
1743, s.l., s.n., s.a. [1746?], p. 33-36. 
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There is, however, an exception to this merely symbolic use of Noodt’s 
reputation. Throughout the eighteenth century, Noodt’s revered name was 
mentioned as an authority with regard to one important argument in favour of 
religious freedom. One suspects that Noodt’s name was mentioned mainly because 
the argument had implications for theology. Is it legitimate to apply to modern 
times the theocratical laws and institutions of the Old Testament, in particular the 
view that idolatry is a capital offence?65 One of the participants in the Stinstra 
affair repudiated the prerogative of civil authorities to use violence in order to 
institute and maintain the true religion by answering this question in the negative. 
The civil government of the ancient Israelites, he observed, was the only one ever 
to have been appointed immediately by God. Consequently, the Hebrew laws and 
regulations cannot be applied to the gentile nations, ‘as the famous Professor 
NOODT demonstrated long ago.’66 Leclerc and Barbeyrac had also paid close 
attention to this particular passage.67 
The Clergy 
The orthodox Calvinist establishment too had little use for the argument from 
natural law, and for obvious reasons: the orthodox were not generally in favour of 
according natural reason a status comparable to revelation. Above all the clergy 
recognized that, given its ambiguities, Noodt’s address need not be regarded as a 
radical text. Most leading theologians of the 1730s and 1740s would not have 
believed that such an eminent legal scholar holding a chair in a public institution 
would even have contemplated saying anything untoward. They were disposed to 
venerate him as a paragon of Dutch erudition who had simply provided yet another 
argument in favour of freedom of conscience. If the Leiden theologians who had 
listened to Noodt’s address were disturbed by his observations on freedom, this did 
not prevent the next generation of orthodox divines from warmly supporting the 
tenor of his message. 
Thus Reformed orthodoxy, too, tried to make good use of Noodt’s reputation. 
The first divine to do this was Johannes van den Honert, a leading theologian of 
Leiden university, known in his own time as the ‘Pope of Holland’. Though one of 
the principal opponents of Johannes Stinstra, Van den Honert was not necessarily 
averse to ideas on toleration. Not surprisingly, Stinstra found this hard to believe, 
and challenged the Leiden professor to prove that his ideas did not contradict those 
of Noodt, Barbeyrac, Locke and Hoadly. Van den Honert took up the gauntlet and 
in 1745 he addressed the Leiden congregation – in the same aula of the university 
where once Gerard Noodt had stood. This address, De mutua Christianorum 
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 The argument was not new; see e.g. H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, I, i, §§ 16-17. 
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 [Anon.], Brief raakende zekere thans zweevende geschillen in Vriesland, Leiden, J. van der Kluis, 
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tomus secundus, pp. 138-140 (for the full title see below). 
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tolerantia,68 was soon translated into Dutch, to which were added copious 
annotations intended to demonstrate that Van den Honert’s views were, in fact, 
corroborated by those of Locke, Noodt and Barbeyrac. 
The orthodox reception of Noodt instigated by Van den Honert usually passed 
over the natural law argument in silence. Instead, the Reformed clergy 
concentrated on the freedom to associate and dissociate. This particular liberty, 
they generally said, had been defended by outstanding scholars, including Gerard 
Noodt, that ‘bright light’ of Leiden university.69 Incidentally, in explicitly 
recognizing the right to dissociation, these theologians departed from orthodox 
tradition. Like Stinstra, they wanted to directly address the problem of the 
Christian commonwealth. But in contrast to the Deductie they said that the nature 
of Christian freedom is not defined by the right to free inquiry. Religious freedom, 
the clergy claimed, is defined by the right to choose, and subscribe to, that 
particular confession of faith with which one’s conscience agrees best. 
In this way (a part of) the orthodox Calvinist clergy70 acknowledged a societal, 
rather than natural, right to religious freedom. This, they asserted, was the real 
purport of Noodt’s address and Barbeyrac’s writings. All those religious societies 
who could demonstrate their allegiance to the Dutch ancien régime had the right to 
put forward and disseminate their own particular views. Individuals should be 
permitted to join or, alternatively, to leave a religious society. These societies 
included the Lutherans, the Remonstrants and the Mennonites. But how does such 
a religious society express allegiance to the Christian commonwealth? First and 
foremost, the orthodox implied, such a society should affirm fundamental 
doctrines, including, above all, the Trinity – hence Van den Honert felt no 
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better than he did Barbeyrac (cf. note 47 above). 
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compunction in persecuting Stinstra, and instead counted orthodox Mennonites 
among his friends. The orthodox appeal to Gerard Noodt again characterizes his 
reception in the Netherlands. His fame was so great and his stature so large that 
each party was eager to appropriate for its own cause his address on religious 
freedom, even if this meant a selective reading of his text. 
The Natural Law School 
At the turn of the seventeenth century, Dutch law scholars, including Gerard 
Noodt, had had no difficulty in combining the study of Roman law with arguments 
derived from natural law. Noodt, indeed, had propagated this in his inaugural 
lecture at Franeker in 1679. In the course of the early eighteenth century natural 
law was established as part of the curriculum of Dutch universities. Apparently 
this applied exclusively to law students. In 1742 one author strongly recommended 
that future theologians, too, should obtain a proper schooling in natural law, so as 
to cure them from their scholastic subtleties.71 
Dutch theologians launched the first large-scale attack on natural law theory in 
1746. The most interesting polemic, however, was initiated some twenty-five years 
later by Frederik Adolf van der Marck (1719-1800), professor of constitutional and 
natural law in Groningen.72 Van der Marck is mainly known in Dutch legal history 
for having disputed the predominance of Roman law in favour of native law. In 
this sense he was hardly a disciple of Gerard Noodt. In fact, he scorned the manner 
in which the older scholars of Roman law had made use of Stoic philosophy in 
order to ground their theories of natural law, and he himself much preferred the 
rationalist metaphysics of Christian Wolff (1679-1754). It is this latter preference, 
and the manner in which he advertised it, that got him into trouble. In 1772 Van 
der Marck was accused by the Reformed clergy of teaching various heresies; after 
an official procedure he was dismissed from the university. Historians have 
sometimes expressed their surprise at the vehemence of the attack on Van der 
Marck. For had he not simply reiterated views put forward long before by Gerard 
Noodt?73 
To make this comparison is, however, to miss the point. Where Noodt had been 
careful, non-committal, or simply conservative, Van der Marck was evidently 
guilty of two transgressions. First, he intruded into the domain of theology by 
elaborating on natural religion, thus unobtrusively dispensing with the orthodox 
Christian doctrine of grace. Second, he undermined the divinely ordained status of 
the Reformed church by demoting it to a society as any other. In consequence, his 
writings were quite logically interpreted as an attack on both the integrity of the 
public church and its position as a basic constituent of the Dutch ancien régime. 
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Van der Marck, in other words, had finally made clear which implications the 
natural law argument had for the Christian commonwealth. In this sense he can be 
regarded as having completed Noodt’s work. Indeed, he appreciated the address on 
religious freedom, but it must be noted that his main authority and guide was 
Barbeyrac rather than Noodt.74 One of his pupils, the Patriot G.J.G. Bacot, who 
was exiled from the Netherlands in 1787 on account of his revolutionary activities, 
commented with evident anger on the misrepresentations to which Noodt’s address 
in his view had been subjected during the eighteenth century, and decried the self-
indulgence and complacency of those who misused it in order to advertise the ill-
deserved Dutch reputation for tolerance. He welcomed Van der Marck’s candour, 
and placed him on a par with Noodt and Barbeyrac.75 Bacot’s ideas illustrate the 
radicalization of the argument for intellectual freedom in terms of natural law 
during the later eighteenth century. 
Not all eighteenth-century students of natural law were as outspoken or 
impulsive as Van der Marck, and not all were in his precarious position. It is 
certain that one of Van der Marck’s correspondents, Elie Luzac, would have 
subscribed to Noodt’s address on religious freedom. Luzac greatly admired Noodt, 
and published his Opera omnia in 1760. Yet on the one occasion that Luzac 
defended spiritual freedom in print, in an anonymous Essai sur la liberté de 
produire ses sentimens (1749) in which he justified his own decision to publish 
J.O. de la Mettrie’s l’Homme machine (1747), it was not Noodt but Barbeyrac 
whom he presented as an authority.76 This example once again illustrates Noodt’s 
role in the eighteenth-century debate on freedom. Pleading for freedom of 
expression rather than freedom of religious belief, and doing so in strongly anti-
clerical terms, Luzac was making far more radical claims than Noodt. It is only 
logical that Luzac should have made more use of Barbeyrac. In the international 
correspondence networks of eighteenth-century erudites – among whom the 
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Huguenots were particularly prominent – Barbeyrac was known as a man who 
favoured radical views.77 Luzac too would have known this. 
Conclusion 
To many eighteenth-century academics, pamfleteers and clergymen, both the 
radicals and the orthodox, the progressive and the conservative, Gerard Noodt’s 
address represented a milestone in a long debate on toleration. It was, however, 
Noodt’s status as an academic of renown, rather than the contents of his Leiden 
address, that was valued and used in the eighteenth-century debate on religious 
freedom. By 1734 Noodt had already become a figurehead, a symbol, a prime 
example of spiritual courage and intellectual integrity, rather than a mere partisan 
in the fight for religious freedom.78 Noodt was eclipsed by his pupil Jean 
Barbeyrac, who succeeded better in coming to grips with the realities of the 
Christian commonwealth. Moreover, it had become apparent by mid-century that 
neither Noodt nor Barbeyrac had adequately broached the issue of religious 
liberty. This became especially clear when the orthodox party, too, began to appeal 
to Noodt’s address and Barbeyrac’s interpretation. What was needed now was a 
more comprehensive defence of religious freedom as a form of intellectual liberty. 
Radicals such as Johannes Stinstra and Johannes Drieberge first brought this 
defence to the fore, and they were followed later in the century by ‘dissenters’ 
within and without the public Reformed Church. But whatever their differences, 
all parties from all sides of the intellectual and spiritual spectrum continued to 
appeal to the ‘bright light’ of Leiden university. Gerard Noodt’s legacy appealed to 
almost everyone, but the appeal of his address attests more to his standing as a man 
of learning and moderation than to the aptness of his arguments to the eighteenth-
century Dutch toleration debates. 
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